

Tape #6

Dave Riehle Interview
with
Jack Maloney

Riehle This is October 21, 1988, a discussion with Shaun Maloney.

Maloney ... that will be kind of warm and we can shut this off and if we need it we'll turn it back up. See, when we started organizing--you want it on the record, that's all right too, but when we were organizing after we got back in the AF of L, I don't recall there being a Teamster's local in Austin, and it was when we were building the North Central Driver's Council and I wasn't involved down there. I was out in the area, out in South and North Dakota and Iowa and Nebraska. I'm already looking around.

Now, what were we --where did we get? Have you got any point that you might want to bone up on?

Riehle Why don't we carry on from where we were?

Maloney Well, where were we last night? I talked so much that your memory's -- I'm trying to think how I can orient myself to make it kind of--go ahead--all right.

When the area contract had been agreed to between the union and the employers and the formal signatures were made, the employers agreed that they would hold a big meeting in Chicago to round up their members.

Now I'm not going to deal at this time with the problems that we had right immediately to the negotiation, that would take some

time and would be a little out of step with what I have in mind now. So the union decided that we would hold a meeting of all the union representatives that had over the road drivers in Indianapolis for September 9, 1938. Now the employers told us that they were calling in representatives of between 1500 and 2000 employers in the 11 states. Now, all we had to go on was their calculations and we had a tremendous amount of delegates from the various local unions come in. And most of them were amazed about the agreement. They were kind of --we had--we got it printed and then circulated it the day before the meeting. The meeting was to be called at 10 in the morning and late that afternoon we met at the Antlers Hotel and that was owned by the Elks or the Teamsters, really. So many of the delegates from the union were, well, they were just--well, I don't want to say dumbfounded, but they were overwhelmed, because many of them in their entire structure did not have contracts that were so articulate in some of the things that we dealt with in this contract.

Now the thing that has to be understood on this contract was that when we started to deal with the employers, we took the flat-footed position that we were dealing for all the local unions, and we permitted no employer to challenge us and there was no Taft

Hartley Act or anything else, and some of them had some ideas that there should be elections of their people to find out whether they wanted to be represented by this agreement. And we soon corrected that idea in those that entertained it.

Now, we had no trouble in explaining to our people the contracts. As I said, many of them couldn't believe it. And this went not only for the newer locals that had only been chartered a short period of time, but many of the older locals in the Teamster's Union. And I will, if I think about it, Dave, I'll send you a copy of the contracts in some of the major locals in Kansas City and Chicago. They were one-page agreements, 8 1/2 x 11, and they were very brief and very short and didn't do much. So many of the officers in the older locals were surprised at some of the articulate clauses that we had dealing with seniority, dealing with the independent owner, the leased operator, dealing with the seniority. And Farrell pointed out to them that they should be mindful that there was absolutely no arbitration permitted under this agreement. He said, "We do not arbitrate. We do not allow and don't let any employer sandbag you into agreeing that under this Agreement he's got rights to go to arbitration. There's no arbitration permitted. If there's any language which says the most you can get out of it is by mutual

agreement, and that means both parties, and the union don't agree, there's no way that we ever agree to any arbitration." So we had no problem getting the contract past our people.

After the meeting was over, Farrell either was contacted by Jack Keeshan or he contacted Jack Keeshan, who was the chair for the employers committee, and Keeshan said that many of the operators in western Iowa, all of the operators in Omaha, Nebraska, South Dakota, and other areas as he defined them, had expressed their dislike of the agreement and openly stated that they were not going to be bound by the terms and the provisions.

Now the interesting fact is that the secretary for the operators was Ralph Nog N-O-G-G. Nogg was the Chicago terminal manager for Fay Watson of Watson Brothers. And he was the secretary for the employer's committee. He took all the notes, done all the bookwork, and Jack Keeshan was the chair. So Watson was aware of what went on every hour of the negotiations, every night on the conference calls that they all used to hold, he was aware of where we were. And they announced that they were not going to abide by the agreement and they would not sign it. Well, this did not create a panic, but many of the locals in the areas named, western Iowa on to the west, all of Nebraska and South Dakota, they were concerned

what they were going to do. They were left out in the cold. And of course this constituted a problem with Tobin, because after the employers had agreed to the agreement, and there had been no problem prior to the signing, I believe Tobin didn't feel that there was going to be any problem, and we had the problem now to think about what's going to be with him. So, here we're faced with a lockout of a considerable number of people. And some of the locals were fairly large-sized locals. The membership involved was well, Omaha, Des Moines, their membership would run a couple of thousand. They were big over-the-road locals. I mean, their over-the-road section was a lot of men involved. City pickup and delivery and long distance runs and the peddle runs. Now we did have a little problem because with the local unions because there was no written provision for the city drivers for the motor freight firms. We had the local peddle runs that were less than 180 miles round trip, but there was no provision for the city pickup drivers, PU&D men. There were no provisions for the dock men. No provisions for the back shop men, that is, the mechanics and the tire men and the people that normally go with a trucking outfit that the Teamsters always assumed control over. And this caused some problem with some of the unions who felt that--and

we had to explain to them, not officially on the podium, but we had to get them on the side and explain to them that this did not cover them and we told them why. But, officially, Farrell had to go into detail and point out that this contract was strictly for the over-the-road motor freight drivers and the local unions would have to negotiate for their city drivers and their local cartage people under their local rules. And that the understanding that we had with Tobin only provided for the over-the-road driver.

Well, some guys kind of expressed a little dismay because while most understood it, there were some that felt that all they had to do was sit back and clip the coupons. And some of the critics of the contract were shooting snide remarks around that we kind of more or less just picked the raisins out of the cake. But we knew why we had done it and we couldn't explain that openly in the meeting because we had that understanding with Tobin that only the over-the-road motor freight drivers would be covered. And there really was no problem with that because the over-the-road companies were not going to risk any problems once they'd agreed to their motor freight drivers. They weren't going to have any problems with the city drivers. And any sensible officer or business agent or secretary/treasurer understood that. But the old diehards that

didn't want to accept the agreement, who didn't want to set down and be bound by any discipline of the area agreement, they were looking for ways to shoot it down and carp upon it.

So we had several thousand men involved in a strike and lockout which commenced September. They started locking out immediately after the employers meeting. The various employers from western Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota. They notified their terminals by mail, by telephone, "shut the doors, we're locking the people out."

So in the terminals, where we had been telling them that we were successful, that we had reached an agreement, now we had the problem we were locked out. And that was a kind of a setback, morally, for some of the guys because they had--a lot of them were first-time people in the union, only a few months and especially in some of the western locals in that division, many of them had not been in the union more than 6 or 8 months and there was no provision in the international constitution that Tobin could legally give the members strike benefits.

So we had quite a little problem. Now, in addition to that, shortly after that, Farrell become quite ill. And he--we were down in Texas and he picked up a fungus or something in his feet and he could

hardly walk and then he had some other--I don't know whether it was a breakdown from fatigue, over-work, or whatever, and he was confined to his bed in Minneapolis. And there we had the all the western area locked out and the companies trying to operate their business with unmarked trucks on the telephone and that's easier done than one would imagine, and without their names and identification on the trucks, they can carry on quite an operation between the various shippers because most of the shippers are cooperative, they're all employers, they're all worried about the bottom line. So after about a month of the strike, lockout, the employers started sending certified letters to the men, advising them that their job, which had been kept open for them since September 10 would now be kept open for a period of 24, 48, 72 hours, something like that. And if they did not return to work within that period of time, they would be considered as having quit voluntarily, removed themselves, and they would replace them with other workers. And this had its effect in some places but not all. And we had the big problem trying to keep the strike going we didn't have money, we were begging money from bigger locals and they were supplying money, and in the eastern part of the state, in the places where the contract was into effect, we were having no

trouble, it was business as usual. But we had more than our hands full, especially in the Omaha area and Sioux City area. They were the real trouble spots. In Des Moines, we worked out an arrangement like we did in all the areas that we could, we worked out arrangements where employers who were willing to pay what the union was demanding, a dollar an hour, 4 cents a mile, they could sign an agreement which would be effective during the period that the strike was on and that they would be bound by whatever was finally concluded at the end. They managed to employ quite a few people, which took the strain off the problem of the day-to-day worry of feeding the families, keeping them from being evicted. And, of course, during this time, we were having all of the problems of the harassment of the various state and city authorities harassing the men. And the anti picketing statute in Nebraska, we had decided we were going to picket in violation of that, which we did. So we were after Tobin come forward with money. The Des Moines local was much better off. They had more people employed and they were able to more or less sustain themselves, but the Omaha, Lincoln, Nebraska, and the Sioux City locals were really hurting. So after repeated meetings with Tobin and Hughes and Gillespie, who were the top officers, with the help of Sandy

O'Brien and Mike Healy, we were able to work out an arrangement. By this time, Tobin had become enthused, but more or less it surprised me. Where he had kind of held a hands off position, we had found that now he was becoming involved in the day-to-day problems.

Oh, I forgot to mention, we had a big problem in Kansas City and there we had the conniving of O.B. Endlow and Enslinger and suck-holing around behind them someplace was the son of a bitch Roy Williams, he was just a kid but he was around, hanging around and doing their dirty work, going for coffee for them about--and we were confident that they were trying to do a job on the contract and on us. And they had the support of Cami, from St. Louis.

Now, we didn't have problems in St. Louis, Missouri with the contract. But Cami, who was the wheel in the teamster's joint council there, saw the danger of the area contract, that in the future it was quite likely an instrument that would clip his wings and would restrict him from a lot of the shenanigans that he had been pulling. So he was supporting Endlow and Enslinger in their efforts to sabotage the agreement. And sabotage our efforts.

But Farrell and Sandy, but mostly Farrell, managed to convince Tobin of the problem. Now, the reason that Kansas City was so

important, there were a lot of lines running into and out of Kansas City to the southwest that were essential to the area agreement, and there was a lot of that trade that went through Kansas City, it was a distribution point for them. Much more so than St. Louis. And the St. Louis operators went along with the agreement. The Kansas City operators were the ones that kicked up their heels.

So Thomas Hughes and Sandy O'Brien had a very, very good relationship, and we were in Kansas City negotiating and Mike Healy was there, but Sandy was in Chicago, and he'd been talking with Tom Hughes. And Farrell had been in Indianapolis talking with Tobin about the Kansas City situation and so we were in the (inaudible) Hotel in Kansas City and the operators were kind of stiff-necked. They thought that--now, we could not prove that Enslinger and Endlow had assured them of the little edge and that they wouldn't have to comply and they could break away from the agreement. And they were counting on Tobin supporting their point of view.

Well, earlier, they were in Indianapolis, and Tobin called Farrell in and they had quite a little shut down and I guess it was there that Tobin became convinced that they were some kind of highbinders and Farrell and the rest of the committee, although Farrell was the

only representative there, were on the right track. So he told Farrell, he said, "Now, you go in to Kansas City and you don't do anything until you hear from me." Now, up to now, the question on Kansas City had been hanging on kind of like a thin thread, whether we were going to get the support that we wanted out of the international to take after the southwest operators that were coming into and out of KC and that we could go full bore on them, with the help of the International.

Well, when Tobin announced that the international was in full support of this strike, that they were going to do everything within their power to make every one of the operators comply with and sign the area agreement, the climate changed from murky and gray to sunshine. The operators were dumbfounded. Well, of course, that made a big, big difference in the whole atmosphere of the overall perspective. However, any time that you've got a big strike going and part of it is settled and those guys who are not settled, the gloom and doom settles in and the guys, a lot of them, why can't we get settled? That thing arises and it presents other problems. And it was getting along now in November, cold and problems and no reasonable reliable source of money, and we finally got an agreement from Tobin and I again as I started to say earlier, I'm

sure that Tom Hughes, through Sandy O'Brien, had a lot to do with it. But Tobin had interested himself in laying down the law on the Kansas City operators, the International agreed that they could not and would not give strike benefits. But what they would do, every week they would give a sum to the locals, like \$3,500, \$5,000 and the local could use it in the form of a relief measure to the worthy people. Well, that was just fine, so every week, we took the people that needed money--the only bad catch was--and whether he done this by design or by chance, he assigned this distribution of the money to Ed Murphy and to this day, I'm a little puzzled if he done that to involve Murphy in the apparatus or whether he didn't feel that he wanted some check and balance on the money, I don't know. I'm inclined to believe that sometimes he wanted to get Murphy involved so he wouldn't be able to go around stabbing people in the back so much. Because I believe by now, Tobin had become convinced that we were not going to really haul him over the windlass and keelhaul him.

And then, of course, the problem set in, the winter and the rest--(arrests^h) were going in the various locals and in Omaha we had all sorts of problems, the employers were setting traps. Then we had certain blowhard officers there that felt they weren't getting enough

of the limelight. Shorty Schultz, the president of the Omaha local for one. And they tried him on a kidnapping charge and we had Al Goldman in, we had Francis Heisler, I believe in a good time or two, and getting legal counsel and keeping the thing going and it was in the middle of January, December and Christmas had come and gone and January and no relief in sight, and the guys--a lot of them, their dauber was dragging, they were getting pretty much discouraged and didn't think there would be any relief in it. And finally, in the latter part of January, indications were that the companies, some of them, at least, wanted to settle. And they were of the misguided opinion that after this big long fight they would be able to bargain down from the basic area agreement. And when we met them in Chicago last days of January and first part of February when the bargaining resumed--now, in the meantime, of course, we were holding regular meetings for the area committee. We were carrying on business as usual in the eastern part of the state, the eastern part of the area, in Minnesota, North Dakota, and in Missouri and when the western operators decided now that they would consider the agreement, and they were faced with problems, they had to license their fleets, and it was getting pretty expensive for them to operate the way they were operating, and the union was

harassing them, they just didn't have a field day, they were getting no end of problems from the unions, and there's no point in going in and trying to pick out one case or another case, the ingenuity of people is surprising at times what they can figure out and how they can harass people and to what extent they'll go.

So they came to the committee and they wanted to bargain down from the area committee, and the answer was absolutely no. The first thing you do is you sign the area committee, you sign the contract. See, we did not even permit them to attend meetings because we considered them bastard calves, they had no right to participate in the affairs of the area committee because they had locked their workers out and expressed the desire not to be bound by the contract, what right did they have to come in and be part of the apparatus?

So when Brady and Meadows and a few more of the Iowa operators first indicated--Bruce, that they wanted to come in, and then Watson, from Omaha, and a few more of the big Omaha operators, why they then come in with the misguided hope that they were going to break our back and that they were going to get some fancy deals. The answer was you sign the agreement the way it's written, no negotiations.

If, after you're back in the area agreement atmosphere and in the apparatus, and if you feel you have a grievance, there is provisions in the machinery that you can air a grievance. How we react to it or what comes of it is another story.

So then they started to company by company started to sign the agreement. Well, of course, that picked up the morale of the companies that signed and I think from about the 1st of February we had by the 15th of February we had them all signed up but Bekins.

Now, an interesting thing developed where we were in Omaha and Brady come to the committee and he told us that he was willing to sign the agreement. And Brady had a big fleet, he was from Fort Dodge, Iowa. "But," he said, "I can't pay the wages because I have to license my rig." And he said, "I've got no leeway. I can't ask for the installment plan. I can't ask for part pay, I can't run half the rigs, I've got to run them all. So," he said, "I'd like to sign the agreement and start paying two weeks later."

Well, Coyle jumped at the chance and I was secretary of the Iowa drivers council and he was the chair. Well, that's all right. I said, "Wait a minute, that ain't all right. The day that you agree to sign this agreement is the day you pay the goddamned scale. No

goddamned way am I going to sign any goddamned agreement that gives you 5 minutes leeway. You'll get from the time you sign the agreement until midnight that night. The next day, 12:01 a.m. you start paying the wages." Coyle went into a tailspin, "Well, we'll see about this!" He charged out to get a hold of Farrell. I forget where Farrell was. He said, "Carl, Maloney's right." He said, "You sign any goddamned agreement that you give an employer the right not to pay the wage scale until a later date, you don't know what kind of trouble you're in." And I told Carl, I said, "Look, Carl, we've got the nuts on this guy. If we've got enough power to make him sign the agreement Monday, we've got enough power to squeeze him to sign it Friday. We don't have nothing to worry about. We've got him tied up. He can't run if we tell him no. so he couldn't quite see it. Well, he didn't even believe it when Farrell told him, and he was pouting around and pouting around and finally, about a week later I jumped into my car and I drove over to Fort Dodge, and I got a hold of Brady and I said, "Now, John,"--he'd been dealing through his man Charlie something. And I called him that stooge that Edgar Bergen had, he had a dummy, you know, that's what I called that Charlie. I forget his name.

Riehle

Charlie McCarthy?

Maloney Charlie McCarthy, that's right. That wasn't the guy's name, but that's what I called him. And I said, "Now, what's the score?" So he went in and he got a hold of his bookkeeping department and everything and he set a firm date and he said, "On that date, we'll sign the agreement. And on that date we'll pay, we'll have our licenses." He didn't have enough money. And he was not in full operation. He was on a bootleg operation basis. Now, I don't know where the hell we're going, I think we'd better pull off here and consult where we're--we ain't got much time.

Well, I went over and I talked to Brady and wanted to make sure, and he called in his bookkeeper and he said when they would be able to sign the agreement. And when they'd start paying the scale. And I called Carl Coyle and I told him, I said, "I'm over here in Fort Dodge, Carl. And I just talked to Brady, and we're going to meet. I don't know if you want to come here or should we tell him to come down into Des Moines, bring him over to Omaha, and we'll sign the agreement and he'll start paying it the next day." "Is that right?" he said, he couldn't believe it. I said, "Yes, that's right. That's the way it's going to be."

Well, he wasn't quite sure of it yet, because they hadn't signed it, but with Brady signing the agreement, which was somewhere

between the 1st and the 15th of February, we arranged for Brady to meet us in Omaha and we had a group of the Sioux City operators and the last of the stragglers in Omaha and we wound up the agreement with the operators in Sioux City that hadn't signed up-- there was one big operator that I think had signed already, Old Croft, and or had signed a tentative agreement that he would sign when the rest of the operators did, and I think the target date that we set for that and the actual date was February 15th. And that's when the strike was officially ended for that part of the country, with the exception of Bekin's Van and Storage. And that continued. Bekin, they were a beaner. And we continued struggling with Bekin for a long time. And I don't recall now, without checking some records when we actually put Bekin to the mat

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Tape #7
Dave Riehle interview
with
Jack Maloney

Maloney There's a couple of stories that I'll tell you that probably don't relate to the history. They once attempted to kidnap Tobin. Three young Italian fellows, dressed up as priests, came into 222 E Michigan St., that was the offices of the Teamster's Union in Indianapolis. And they got talking with Tobin and he received them, took them into his office. And they were going to kidnap him for money. And he was a doughty old bastard and I guess he put up a beef and they didn't expect it. And they didn't get away with it. He hollered and screamed and they put up a beef and there was enough people in the building and I don't know what eventually happened to them, but the first time that I came there to get in the office with Farrell, I was amazed. I said, "This is a sally port." In the prisons, that name is the only place I've ever used it. A sally portal. That you come in one gate and you come in an area and they lock the gate. There's an open area and there's a gate on the other side that's locked. And they close the gate behind you and then they shake you down or whatever and when everything is okay, they open the gate and you can go into the other area.

Well, when we come in to see Tobin, we were admitted to the first gate and the door was shut and I think locked behind us electronically, and we're sitting there. And his office girl come out

and she's behind bars. This is actual bars, Dave. They're gold and everything, but like you've seen these elevators that have them bars? That's the way his office looked. She come out, "Who are you? Who do you want to see? Do you want to see Brother Tobin or Brother Hughes?" "Brother Tobin." "Do you have your cards?" "Yes." "Okay." And she'd look you over and she went back and told Tobin and the first time I didn't know this guy yet, his name was Gillespie, John Gillespie, a big guy, 6'4" or so or maybe bigger. He was also from Boston. He come with Tobin. And he come out, "Hello boys. Brother Tobin will be with you in just a minute." That was bullshit. He was putting his eye on us. He made it appear that he was just passing down. But he didn't come into the room either. So pretty soon Tobin come out. "Okay, boys, come on in now. And you are Dobbs?" "Yes." "And you are Brother Maloney?" "Yes." So we sat down and we started talking.

Well, from that time on, of course, you were known and you could come in, but you still went through that procedure. It was a regular sally port.

Now, another very interesting thing, I got to know Tom Hughes. He was the secretary/treasurer. I used to have a particular girlfriend in Chicago and when I was in Chicago I'd call her up and she'd come

in. She lived in a little town, Winnetka. She'd grab the el and come down. This night we'd been over to one of the theaters and we were stopping in to, oh, Christ, it's the bar that's owned by the guy that had the--he was the head of the stagehand's union. I'll think of the name of the place. And that was the bar that Mike Boyle, Umbrella Mike, made famous. He was the business agent for the electrician's union, this is the report anyway. But he'd go out and strike a job. Quigley, Quigley's Saloon. And he'd arrange to meet the contractor in Quigley's Saloon. And he'd stand at the bar talking with him, supposedly having a drink. And he had a subordinate watch him. And Mike would hang his umbrella, there was an umbrella hanging up there, and this contractor would come in and he'd piece off Boyle by putting money in the umbrella. And the guy that would go and put the money in was some hand of whatever contractor was on strike and this guy would look at it. And when the right amount of money was there, the guy from Mike Boyle would not and the strike was over. That was the story, anyway. But Quigley was head of the Chicago stagehands and he had this bar on State and Lake Street. So we stopped in there to get a drink--not me, I wasn't drinking, but she wanted a drink. That was fine. And here's Sandy O'Brien and Tom Hughes. And they'd been out on a hell of a caper and they

were half-drunk, and they looked like hell. And I was sure it was Tom Hughes, I hadn't formally met him like that. And I walked over to Sandy and I said, "Sandy," he looked terrible, "what the hell's the matter?" And apparently they'd been up in one of the palaces of pleasure around there and they were down there, he didn't have a necktie on, and they had little rooms in the back end there where you could have business discussions, 2 or 3 of them. And he said, "Goddammit, I've got to get Tom out to the Ambassador West," a fancier hotel out quite a ways. Sandy lived in town. He said, "Jesus, I ain't got no necktie for him or anything." Well, I said, "Sit here, Sandy." There were barbershops open night and day and I said I'd go over to the barbershop in the Sherman Hotel and pick up a tie and get a barber. You go over and tell the barber, "Hey, you've got to bring your tools, come over and shave a guy." They used to do that all the time.

So I asked Jewel, "Do you mind staying here while I go over and get a necktie?" and so on. So Hughes got shaved up and Sandy was about half snorted up and so was Tom Hughes and the guy come over and shaved him and cleaned him up and got him a necktie and Sandy got a cab and they went out. And the next morning we were in a meeting and Sandy come over and thanked me. I said, "Just

don't say nothing about it, Sandy, forget it. Don't say anything."

Well, I guess I kind of ingratiated--I said nothing, I wanted no favors out of it, so I got to be pretty friendly with Hughes because we were in and out of there, because we were later on a couple of cases that Tobin was defending us on. I had occasion to be in Indianapolis quite a bit, several times. But Hughes was telling me an interesting thing, as a result of the Danbury Hatter's case and some subsequent decisions, the Teamster's Union office used to be in Massachusetts. And they were frightened that they could be sued, so many of the unions moved into Indiana. The painters, quite a few of them. And they moved in there because of the peculiarity of the Indiana law that would protect them. And, Hughes, said, they formed a non-aggression pact with the Indianapolis teaming crafts that they wouldn't attempt to organize the teamsters. They were looking for a home.

And they got situated and had a little treasury at the time and they brought it with them. Now, John Gillespie and Tobin and Hughes were Irish Catholic and all members of the Benevolent Order of Elks.

Riehle

Is that the Catholic order?

Maloney Yes, you don't have to be a Catholic, but I know very few people that are Elks that aren't Catholic. I never was one, but everyone that I know that says they're an Elk--so they went to the lodge meetings. Well, as soon as the people found out that they were the heads of this union, they shunned them. They wouldn't play pool with them, they wouldn't play cards with them. When they come in the reading rooms they'd hardly do anything. So Hughes said it was a goddamned miserable existence they had. Well, the Elks had the habit of building a hotel in certain cities. They used to call them the Antlers Hotel. That was the name they'd use and that's where they'd have their gym and their meeting rounds and they thought that by paying rent to themselves they'd make money and then they'd rent rooms to the traveling public and do something like that thing they've got in Nebraska, that (inaudible) hall. That's a big cult that race track and everything. If you don't know about that, I'll talk to you about that later. But anyway after they'd been there a few months, the secretary started to announce that they were in bad shape, that the lodge couldn't meet the expenses, and the bank was about to foreclose the building on them and they'd be forced to look for new quarters. Well, everyone was down in their cups, they didn't know where to go. And I don't know what time this was, must

have been much earlier when they were there. So Tobin got wind of it and he dug up his lawyer and he said, "You look around and find out everything you can about it."

So the lawyer found out what was needed to save the building and how much money would have to be invested to pick up the mortgage and they had somebody analyze it and figured it was a good investment. It could pay but the place had been improperly managed but it should be able to pay for itself. So quietly and through an assumed name, the Teamsters put up the money and acquired the building.

Well, this was good news to the Elks and so then the news got out that they weren't going to lose their building, that the building had been acquired by someone who was not going to turn them out and they could stay there but they'd have to reorganize certain things and they'd have to make it now more businesslike.

So this went on for a couple of months, all the time the lawyers were getting the papers done and everything, and finally they have a big meeting and all the Elks are going to come and meet this benefactor. And it turns out to be Tobin and Hughes and Gillespie. And he said that these sons of bitches that wouldn't talk to us before, he said, now would have --he said the pleasure of that night-

-and they owned that building, that Antlers Hotel, they wound up owning it over the years. But he was really rubbing that in.

Now, quickly, in Nebraska, which is an anti labor state, anti picketing statutes, which had the most repressive legislation there is for working men, they had severe winters. And there were people there that wanted to keep their horses, they wanted their horse shows and their style shows and they wanted to figure out how to do it. And somehow, somewhere they got the idea that they'd built a racetrack and they'd have pari-mutuel betting. And the pari-mutuel betting would pay, it would pay for building the building and during the off-season racing, when the racing went on for a few weeks or whatever, they'd use that hall, the stables to stable their horses in the wintertime, they could heat it, they could use it as a real auditorium for all their affairs, and they have a king and a queen, and it's a cult, it's a royalty. And the name Aksarben is Nebraska spelled backwards. And we exposed that about the history and everything there in the paper one time, about their cult. And they used that where they can stable their horses, they can put on their style shows, they can put on anything they want, and it's almost free for them because of the income from the race track and everything else.

In 1938, that's the home of the UP railroad. And we were doing business at that time--what the hell was his name, that Roosevelt ^{FILED} sent on to be the ambassador to Ireland. They ~~filed~~ the picture "Boys Town" out there. I'll think of his name, too. Francis P. -- I'll think of his last name. And he's the guy that had the air conditioned office and Harry DeBoer and I and Lou Miller were in there, and ^{Al} ~~Hal~~ Russell during the bakery strike. And he started giving us a whole bunch of sass--Matthews, Francis P. Matthews, was his name. His daughter was out there during the filming of "Boys Town," making a damn fool of herself over Mickey Rooney. But that Spencer Tracey was a pretty good head, we met him out there, a pretty good guy. He couldn't get over the fact that the Teamsters were getting 42 cents an hour. He had a big office and he had a desk that you couldn't reach across, you had to walk around it. And Al Russell was a 6-year legal student and he was a legal clerk, he could handle a legal clerk's job, that's a category, I guess, and he was about 1 year and 2 semesters short or one semester short of being able to sit for the bar. That's what he told me anyway, and I believe it.

So Matthews is giving us a big long treatise in legal language and he was telling us that Al Russell had an old suit on and it was ragged--

the elbows were worn out of it, it was one of them Norfolk suits that you had belts around it, it had a belt and they were hanging down on each side, that's the way it was built, it was an English type suit. So he's giving us a lesson in language. Harry recalls it too, he was sitting next to Al and then there was Lou and then me. So Al had enough of this and he got up and he started putting his finger at Matthews and he started giving him language back and the same kind of legalese. And it dumbfounded this Matthews. And Al was preaching to him for a couple of minutes before Matthews got his wind. And he said, "Sit down, you ragged little upstart." And Al sat down. And Harry got a hold of him and grabbed him and pushed him up and says, "You stand up there and tell that son of a bitch off, Al, you were doing a good job up to now." And about that time, Matthews pushed a button and I poked Lou and Lou poked Harry DeBoer and we pointed to the door, we knew what was coming. In a minute, the security police would be there and Christ almighty, pinched in his office, you know what that is, that's a trip to the hoosegow and that's bail and all that sort of crap. And it's a useless pinch. So we got up and got out of there. But that was the kind of a system they had there, at Aksarben.

Well, when they had the filming of "Union Pacific," Barbara Stanwyk and them and they had the premier, they put the town in costume, all the people had to have 1890 costumes or whatever, 1865, whatever. The men had to wear top hats, the girls in the stores had to buy dresses, they had to wear bustles, they had to buy all of this stuff out of their own pocket. And they were squawking. They rerouted the streetcars so they wouldn't run down the main drag, I think it was Harney Street, or 16th Street, for a couple of blocks. And they had false fronts out, the horses tied out in front, and they hired a street sweeper to sweep up the horse manure so it wouldn't bring flies. You know, it had to be sanitary. And they had horses tied up and they had these false fronts, so they called Tommy Williams, I mean Tommy Smith. They wanted to know if the drivers wanted to participate in the parade. "Yes, yes, we will." And they wanted to know what kind of floats. Well, this Tommy was quite a guy, "Well, we're going to have 2 flatbeds," he's making it up right out of his mind. "Well, what are they going to be so we know how to group them." "Well," he said, "the first one is going to be about a 30-foot flatbed trailer and there's going to be nothing on it but an old fashioned outhouse and there will be a sign, "modern plumbing South Bottoms," that's where the poor people lived in

(inaudible). And he said the second one is going to be a second flatbed truck, and it will be a table with a woman with about 5 or 6 kids sitting at it and the kids are going to look ragged and there's going to be nothing to eat and the sign is going to say, "We don't have no food, kids, because your daddy can't make it on 25 cents an hour."

The day before the parade they come down and arrested all the officials they could get in the union. They kept them in jail until the parade was over. And the only guys that weren't arrested was me and (inaudible) and we didn't happen to be in the office, we was out doing something. They arrested Tommy and Love and Al Russell and they held them on an open warrant until the parade was over. Five or six of them they kept in jail until that parade was over because they figured they'd do it. When the parade was over, they come down and let them out of jail.

Now, I can get back after I'm through telling stories, I wanted to talk more about the area committees. On the original formation that Carl had talked about, we were unable to develop that after the settling of the '34 strike because of the many, many problems. The union had been successful at only getting 62% of the men to vote for the union. That meant that we had 38% of the guys to win back into

the union. We had the Henry Ness family to take care of. We had John Belore's family. We had Steve Glaser in the hospital yet for a while. Two or three other people that were injured. The union had about \$45,000 in markers around town, and most of these people believed in the union or they wouldn't have given us credit in the first place, so that wasn't the most pressing, there were other things. Ness' family, we had 2 office girls, and we were trying to rebuild the union. And the bigger thing was getting rid of Cliff Hall. And the 3 or 4 people that he still controlled in the executive board. That was the biggest. The Ness family financially, but organizationally the biggest thing was getting rid of Hall, which called for a new election and then that blabbermouth Holstein got the union into a premature fight over the Lyman killing. And then after Hall was deposed, came the, we feel, the efforts of Cliff Hall and the group that we rooted out agitating Tobin, and Tobin anxious to get rid of us in the first place. And the danger of taking the charter and putting in a receiver. And we were more afraid of a receiver than anything because then we'd be dead ducks. Even, as Carl explained, revoking the charter was not nearly as bad - I couldn't see it right away, I couldn't see why, it took some time for me to think that one out. Revoking the charter was not nearly as

bad as putting in a receiver because if he revoked the charter Carl said, "We are then free to live but if he put in a receiver, then, Brothers, we are done because he will tell us what to do, he will say who's going to be here and who's going to be there, and they will go to the employers and weed us out and one by one and that's the way it will be."

And the union was mounting a fight to head that off and, of course, Tobin was anxious to get it going. And subsequently the charter was --the union was expelled, which by that time when the charter was revoked the union expelled it. I thought then that that was better than having him appoint somebody in as a receiver. And there was people around that could have been a receiver. Pat Corcoran, for one. He could have brought somebody in for another. So now we had to regroup the union, our contracts were coming up, this was in March, the contracts were to expire in June, and shortly after that, Tobin sets up this Local 500.

Looking back on it, that was a blessing in disguise that he set up 500 and let Cliff Hall run it. That give us the breathing time we needed, although I couldn't see it then, but when I look back now, Dave, had he put a receiver in and put strong men in there, it might have been a different story. But by revoking our charter and

keeping us intact we were working in the industry, we had the contracts, and he set up local 500--they had to establish themselves, we were established, such as we were.

This I thought out later, partly maybe when I was laying in prison, partly maybe earlier. But I'm willing now to concede and I did earlier, much earlier, and I talked to my brother, Don, about it, that we were, I believe, much better off as events happened. Tobin putting in 500 with Cliff Hall as the leader. I'm sure he convinced Tobin that he could get back and do the things that he'd been doing in 574 for 8 or 10 years previous, and that would have suited Tobin at that time. So that kind of put the slow bell on organizing in the area committee. But that did not slow down the ideas and that did not slow down the idea that anybody coming in to Minneapolis had to belong to the union. And we were still organizing, drivers would come in and we'd put the bum on them. They'd come into the union. We'd organize them and make them become members of the union. Call them up. We used to call--our style was--now maybe some organizers like Tommy Williams or some of them other guys would shake the driver down, but our pattern, our style was to call the company, tell the company, "Your truck is here, it's not going to move until these drivers are in the union. It's going to

cost 60 or 100 or 50 or 20 or whatever. You're going to have to pay them the scale. All the loading and unloading time. They're going to have to be paid, wire up the money." You're not going to say-- well, they might have got the money back, but we made some instances, even if the men had to pay the money back they got--so we were building help with other unions, talking to drivers.

So the organization of the area committee was slowed during the months that we were outside of the AF of L. And, of course, we had the fights with the members of Local 500, with the hoodlums. So once we got back into the AF of L, back into the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, then the --well, maybe the second stage we might call if of the area committee commenced. But it was done on the state basis. And then we held a subsequent meeting, and I'm just going over this so there's some record if it appears in doubletalk when you get it, no newspaper's old until it's been read, as Mickey says, but we then in January of '37 organized the North Central District Driver's Council. And we could then start bringing people in.

But I don't know if I've dealt with the situation of the St. Paul drivers.

Riehle

(inaudible)

Maloney Have we got that on record? Where we had the problem with 120?
Because we couldn't do anything until we got 120 out of our hair.

Riehle (inaudible)

Maloney Yes, I wanted to make sure that that's covered, because when 120
was not part of us then we could go ahead.

Now, I went over, I know, the first big instance that we had with
Meadows Transfer and Carl Coyle, that was the first example where
a big trucking company from another city tried to invade our wage
scale. Now, what has to be made clear in all of this was the long-
term objective that we had, and we were feeling our way along, as
I've told you before. We could not have an agreement on a
piecemeal basis otherwise the plan would be no good, because we'd
be forever and ever trying to make it--it would be a jigsaw puzzle if
we had different contracts.

So if those points have been covered, I think I've spoke about the
fights we had with some of the International people, Burger,
Murphy, Endlow, Enslinger, and a couple of more. Cami.

Well, now we're into Chicago and this is in early April of 1938 and
the problem comes, we have to have something to do, so we
developed what we called a model agreement, we had the text of an
agreement and we had the officials of these unions agree to it. And,

of course, we had to take the position that we didn't give a damn. We just took the position--we were dealing for the men, there was no such thing as elections to determine bargaining units. There was no Taft Hartley Act. The Wagner Act was in effect, and there was elections to determine bargaining agencies all right, but we just would never allow, and we couldn't, and I think you can understand why, we took a flatfooted position that we represented the drivers and if the company didn't believe it, we had to prove that we did. And that we could shut them down. And that was sometimes a pretty much a calculated risk and a very, very delicate one. So after we had an agreement in the early days of April, because it was in March--I may have some paper on that, early part of March that we met in Chicago with--at the Teamster's headquarters, when Sandy announced that he'd gotten the jurisdiction of all the highway drivers coming into and out of Chicago and that he was in full support of the area committee's efforts. Then we immediately got together and had a larger representative group than was in that group there, because mostly what we had in Chicago at that time were guys like ~~Roder Laughlin~~ ^{RED O'LAUGHLIN}, just more titular heads rather than--we got some more rank and file guys in, more broader spectrum of people.

* HEAD OF DETROIT
TEAMSTERS

Now we're looking for who we're going to deal with. We've got ideas. And I know Jim Cannon once said, you know, "A group of people can get in a room and talk themselves into anything." So we talked ourselves into the fact now that we had a contract and we had a position that we had the men, now who are we going to prove it to?

Now we knew the make-up of the American Trucking Association. It's kind of like the AF of L. Members belong to it but the ATA doesn't have any disciplinary or enforcement (inaudible). But we couldn't stand to be piecemealed, either, so we discussed that.

Now, when I say we, I don't mean the whole committee, Farrell, Lou, Jack Worth, myself, Tommy Smith, Ted Neal, and earlier Farrell had discussed this with Carl and so on, so it wasn't any vacuum thing. And we had the opinion that we had to go through the record that no truck owner could tell us, "I belong to AT&A and they're doing to deal for us." So we had to draft a letter in such a mien that we would get a positive and definite answer from the head of ATA that they could not deal for their members. So a letter was carefully couched and written and sent--and I think the guy's name was Ted Rogers, and sent to him and it was kind of forceful, as I remember. The text of the letter said we demanded that he set

down and talk with us about the wages, security, the working conditions, and everything of the drivers employed in the various trucking companies which he represented, and so forth. Well, we got exactly the answer that we wanted out of it, the answer come back that they were in an advisory capacity, they had absolutely no power to interfere with the individual companies about their work practices or hiring practices or employment practices, that was not their intent. There was nobody then, in the face of that letter, who could say, "I belong to ATA," no that's just exactly what we wanted. Well, that part was okay. Now we have the problem of how are we going to get a group of Chicago truck operators to sit down and speak authoritatively for the industry. We figured that there was at least a couple of thousand to 2500 truck companies involved and we said there's no use of us picking up the small change. We got to zero in on the big companies because they're the factors in the industry. If we're able to get them in line and knock them into position, we can go around like salmon going through a school of herring, we can pick up the little guys on the way back. But if we run around trying to pick up Me-a-You Transfer and I Go Transfer and a little bit here and a little bit there, we'll be fighting the windmill 5

years from today, we'll have nothing. We'll organize a guy and he'll go broke or he'll slip out of us and so on.

So we said we were going after the big companies.

Now, Sandy O'Brien becomes a factor now in the area of what to do because he was a Chicago person. And he come right straight out with it. Well he said, the guy who is the head of the Chicago Cartage Exchange is Lashom. Lashom had the Lashom Cartage was the name of his company and he said unfortunately they deal with the Chicago Teamsters. And they don't deal with any highway drivers, they're local cartage people, they don't--well, now it's a different thing, but then they don't go much beyond the greater city limits of Chicago.

Now to say they didn't have any road drivers in that bunch would be untrue, but they were not in a regulated motor freight industry and in the event I didn't make it clear before, while we were off the record, the industry had only been regulated since May of 1935. And we're there now in April/May of '38, 3 years later. And many of these companies had

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